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The introduction of metacomputing and distributed 
resource management mechanisms to the Internet and 
World Wide Web will make available to users and 
applications a diverse set of previously unavailable 
network and computing resources. Middleware resource 
management systems (RMSs) will use geographically 
distributed, heterogeneous resources to support 
applications with a wide range of computation needs 
[1][2][3][4].  
The RMS in such an environment is responsible for: 
efficiently scheduling multiple simultaneous tasks onto 
specific network resources; supporting user requirements 
for performance and security; and providing support for 
tasks to adapt to changing resource availability. This is 
accomplished by balancing costs for various services 
against their benefits, where the benefits can be to 
individual users or may be associated with the system as a 
whole, e.g. total throughput. 
The notion of security variability has been discussed 
before. A Quality of Protection parameter is provided in 
the GSS-API specification [5]. This parameter is intended 
to manage the level of protection provided to a message 
communication stream by an underlying security 
mechanism (or service). Another early reference to a 
variable security service is that of Schneck and Schwan 
[6], which discusses variable packet authentication rates 
with respect to the management of system performance.  
In previous work we have discussed fundamental 
Quality of Security Service (QoSS) concepts [7]. In [8] 
we defined a preliminary security service taxonomy 
defining the range of security services a RMS may need 
to manage. We addressed the problem of how users and 
administrators can understand and easily interact with the 
wide range of security services and mechanisms, by 
providing methods for translation of a simplified user 
abstraction of security to detailed underlying mechanisms 
[9].  
We present our Quality of Security Service (QoSS) 
concepts in terms of variant security mechanisms and 
dynamic security policies. We also describe briefly our 
QoSS costing framework and demonstration, which 
illustrate how costs associated with network security 
services can be calculated and supplied to a RMS.  Finally 
we talk about our experiments on linking QoSS 
conditions to an underlying security mechanism, such as 
IPsec. Our aim is to demonstrate an approach through 
which security could be treated as a QoS dimension. 
 
2. Overview of Quality of Security Service 
 
Relative to traditional QoS attributes (e.g. jitter, 
deadline, latency) security has been handled rather 
statically and indirectly.  We have developed a theory of 
Quality of Security Service and a related security-costing 
framework that supports extension of QoSS functionality 
to embrace existing and emerging security technologies 
[10] [11].  Our goals have been to leverage existing 
security mechanisms to improve system availability, 
predictability, and efficiency, while maintaining, if not 
increasing the security of the distributed system.   
Variability in user and application security 
requirements allows the underlying control system to be 
more adaptable in responding to requests for resources, 
and variability in system and resource security 
requirements allows the distributed system, e.g., through 
quality of service (QoS) middleware, to offer security 
choices to users or applications. The availability of user 
security choices along with support for management of 
security resources in response to user requests enables 
quality of security service (QoSS).  We have found that 
many existing mechanisms and policies allow for security 
variance.  For example MAC and DAC allow for 
complete solutions via their “dominance” and set 
inclusion relationships, and many so-called fixed 
requirements can be seen to actually define only 
minimums, allowing for a range of solutions.  Some 
examples of security service attributes that provide ranges 
are the choice of cryptographic algorithm, number of 
rounds or key length, assurance level or strength of 
boundary control in a remote environment, or even the 
capability level of the environment’s security 
administrators. 
QoS can be seen as the modulation of resources to 
deliver requested services to users, which depends on the 
control and variability of resources. Similarly, QoSS 
involves the modulation of security resources, and 
depends on the control and variability of those security 
resources.  In a typical distributed system, the security 
restrictions and requirements confronted by a user 
emanate from many layers, components and services. 
How can QoS or resource management middleware make 
sense out of this apparent chaos in attempting to manage 
the system efficiently?  Our approach involves several 
abstractions: the first is to view all security restrictions as 
service attributes.  The second is to view all security 
restrictions as a range that defines a set of partially 
ordered possibilities, where some values are “more 
secure” than others.  Of course, in some cases the range is 
degenerate, meaning the related service can be used in 
only one way. 
To understand how these ranges can be used in a 
layered distributed architecture, consider how a request 
for execution of a task is passed between different layers, 
and security services are provided in response to these 
requests.  As this task sequence is processed, there are 
both choices and limits regarding each security restriction 
or requirement.  A choice is the security range request 
passed to the next layer.  A limit defines which requests 
from previous layers are acceptable.  In the end, if the 
task is realized by the system, meaning that the various 
choices and limits have been successfully resolved, the 
user’s expectations for quality of security service will 
have been met.  Additionally, the QoS middleware will 
have had additional latitude, by way of variant security 
requirements, in fulfilling user and system-wide goals, 
thereby potentially increasing the availability, 
predictability, and efficiency of the system. 
With choices and limits applied for various security 
attributes at different layers in the task sequence, the 
question arises as to how these requirements should relate 
to each other. The following relationships between 
requirement ranges appear to be necessary for the 
coherent enforcement of security in a layered distributed 
system: 
1. The maximum of each limit and choice range 
dominates the minimum of that range. 
2. At each layer, a requirement choice range must 
be within the corresponding limit range. 
q This restriction reflects the protocol that a 
given layer will respect its own limits. 
3. Each choice range must be within the previous 
choice range in the sequence.  
q This reflects a natural protocol to respect the 
choice of the previous layer, without which, 
the QoSS requested by the previous layers 
(ultimately, the user) will fail. This also 
indicates that security choices will constrict 
as the task proceeds. 
4. Each choice range must be within the next limit 
in the sequence.  
q This restriction means that requests that are 
out of bounds will be rejected. 
5. The limit ranges of each provider in a task 
sequence must all intersect.  
q This is a consequence of items 2, 3, and 4. 
Obviously, if two ranges in a task invocation 
sequence don't intersect, there does not exist 
a value that could satisfy both ranges; this 
would disallow a task from execution. 
These relationships are illustrated in Figure 1. Because 
the choices and limits are partially ordered and 
consequently comparable, it is possible for a security 
service selection algorithm to be encoded. In the 
following discussion, automated mechanisms are 
discussed for managing security-level choices and 
network-mode limits. 
 
3. Managing Costs and Variability of 
Security Service 
 
If a particular security mechanism is “fixed” (i.e., 
always applied) then the overhead for the mechanism is 
part of the normal cost of running the task and the normal 
costing mechanism used by the QoS control mechanism 
will suffice. For variant security mechanisms, however, 
the security overhead will vary, depending on the security 
vector of the user’s QoS request and any subsequent 
refinement of the user's choices due to the application or 
RMS. Thus, the middleware must have access to detailed 
information about the resource costs for each variant 
security mechanism.  
We are working on a QoSS costing demonstration. In 
this approach we use a model for tasks, that incorporates 
the ideas of variant security services and value ranges for 
the security attributes. We additionally take into account 
an operational mode parameter, because network status 
could influence the security policy and security services 
applicable to the task: under certain conditions, a user or 
administrator may be willing to accept more (or less) 



















Figure 1: Requirement Range Relationships 
 
For example, during an emergency, a military 
commander might decide to forgo certain security 
protocols in order to get some important information 
transmitted quickly. If such dynamic policies are created 
and analyzed before deployment of the computer network, 
the network can respond to changing environments, by 
having access to a predefined set of alternate security 
policies. In each of these cases, the effects of changes to 
the security mechanisms would be predefined and limited 
to meet the desired alternate security policy.  We refer to 
three example modes: 
q normal, which corresponds to the typical operating 
conditions of the system 
q impacted, which represents a situation with a large 
amount of simultaneous requests received by the 
system 
q emergency, which can be translated to 
requirements for the strongest security available (or 
in another interpretation it could mean completion 
of requested tasks as quickly as possible 
disregarding security). 
With the modes approach, the acceptable range of 
values for a security variable attribute depends on the 
network “mode”. So the selections offered to the users 
and applications are within the limits of the mode. 
Still, the security services and underlying mechanisms 
may present too many variables and choices for users or 
applications to manage without automated support. 
Instead of presenting to the user all combinations of 
security mechanisms and parameters for the variant 
services, we can offer a simplified abstraction of security, 
in the form of security level choices, like “high”, 
“medium”, “low”. These selections are mapped to 
detailed mechanism invocations via a translation matrix. 
The security administrator or system security engineer 
would pre-select various specific mechanisms and settings 
that are assigned to the security variables for each of the 
choices offered to the user. 
 
3.1 An example for network modes and security 
levels  
 
Let's illustrate the notion of network modes and 
security levels with the following example: 
Assume that we work on a system which can provide 
data confidentiality using any of the following encryption 
algorithms: DES, 3DES, AES (these algorithms can be 
considered to be ordered by strength, measured in terms 
of the work factor associated with a brute force attack). 
This means that there is variability for the security 
attribute "encryption algorithm" and the set of acceptable 
values for it ranges from no encryption to AES. These are 
the limits imposed by our system's capabilities. 
If we dynamically change the policy we apply, 
according to a network mode parameter, the limits 
imposed by the system can be different for each mode, 
e.g.:  
Table 1: Translation Matrix for Security levels and Network Modes 
 
 Security Level 
Network Mode Low Medium High 
Normal DES 3DES AES 
Impacted None DES DES 
Emergency AES AES AES 
 
-in Normal Mode:  DES, 3DES, AES  
-in Impacted Mode:  no encryption, DES 
-in Emergency Mode:  AES (in this case the range is 
degenerate). 
Users can select any algorithm within the limits of the 
mode. If we supply security levels, the user will have just 
select "low", "medium" and "high". These levels will be 
mapped to a specific algorithm through a translation 
matrix, like Table 1. So we can see that network modes 
provide alternate mappings for the security levels offered 
to the users, since "high" security would be translated in a 
different way if the system is in normal or in emergency 
mode. 
In this example the security levels are mapped to a 
specific value for the encryption algorithm. Security 
levels can also be mapped to a sub-range within the 
acceptable range of values for the variant security 
attribute. The underlying RMS would then be responsible 
for further modulating the request and assigning specific 
values to the attributes, that would be within the mapped 
subrange. 
The relationship between system capabilities, network 
mode limits and security level choices can be seen in 
Figure 2. This scheme represents an integration among 
the choices and limits of the system's layers, in which 
both user choices and system limits are determined by 
network modes. Such a strong integration of modes with 
choices as well as system limits would be typical in a 
military environment, for example. In less integrated 
policy domains, such as the Internet, user choices and 
mode limits can be completely independent: that means 
that user choices could involve values and ranges outside 
the limits of the network mode (in such a case the request 
would be rejected, however). 
 
3.2 Calculation of Resource Costs for Quality of 
Security Service 
 
To quantify the costs related to a task’s security 
requests, we use a costing framework (based on a security 
service taxonomy [8]) with cost expressions relative to 
every security service invoked by the task. Each service 
may access various resources, e.g. CPU, memory and 
bandwidth (other cost factors are possible, e.g. disk space, 
and will be added to our framework). We discriminate 
between start-up and streaming costs. The calculated costs 
can then be fed to a middleware QoS mechanism for use 
in its resource allocation and scheduling decisions. 
Cost values of any given security selection within a 
security policy may be calculated by knowing the fixed 
and variable costs of all settings of security mechanisms.  
In our QoSS demo, these mechanisms are represented by 
variable attributes offered by applicable services.  The 
cost for a given service is calculated using a formula 
dedicated to the cost type and the attributes relevant to the 
given service.  For example, a formula might exist for 
calculating the CPU start-up cost associated with 
providing the service of integrity on the Network Wire 
where the variable attribute involved is the selection of 
the authentication algorithm. 
Formulas are defined by entering an algebraic 
expression and a table of cost values for each non-linear 
function in the expression. An algebraic expression 
consists of attribute variables, non-linear functions, 
constants, and basic mathematical operators.  For example 
a hypothetical algebraic expression might be: “1000 + 
f(Authentication_Algorithm) + 2 x Key_Length”.  An 
example cost table value for the authentication algorithm 
attribute md5 could be f(md5) = 1200.  For 
Key_Length=128 the resultant calculated cost for this 
example is 2456 cost units (where in a real expression 
cost units could be clocks or bytes per packet). 
Our QoSS demo offers two approaches for observing 
calculated costs.  In demo mode, the user selects the 
network mode, security level, and a strategy for 
determining settings within any selected ranges for mode 
and level.  This strategy simulates input from a resource 
management system, and allows selection of minimum, 
middle, and maximum settings for the given mode and 
level. Figure 3 shows costs associated with a hypothetical 
task for a given mode, level and resource management 
























Figure 2: Security Level and Network Mode Range Relationships 
 
planning the security requirement ranges provided to each 
mode and level. 
In task mode, costs for executing tasks are determined 
based on 1) the administrator’s current selection of 
network mode, 2) the user’s current selection of security 
level, and 3) the current selection of the resource 
manager’s strategy for determining specific values within 
the selected mode and level ranges.  Costs may also be 
displayed in task mode, but, more significantly, task mode 
is able to export cost values to a QoS resource manager. 
 
4. Modulating IPsec for provision of Quality 
of Security Service 
 
For security to be a real part of QoS, security choices 
must be presented to users, and the QoS mechanism must 
be able to modulate related variables to provide 
predictable security service levels to those users. As a 
proof of concept we want to demonstrate how a specific 
security mechanism can be modulated to provide different 
levels for security, in response to QoSS requests from 
users. 
We chose to experiment with IPsec. The IPsec 
mechanism provides services including confidentiality, 
integrity, authenticity, through the establishment of 
Security Associations (SA) among the entities that wish to 
communicate. The SA is a "simplex connection that 
affords security services to the traffic carried by it" and it 
essentially is "a management construct used to enforce a 
security policy in the IPsec environment" [12]. There is a 
set of parameters associated with each SA, which 
includes, among others: SA lifetime, encryption and/or 
authentication algorithms and keys, and protocol mode 
(tunnel/transport). The SAs can be generated manually, 
but that approach does not scale well. The Internet Key 
Exchange (IKE) along with the Internet Security 
Association and Key Management Protocol (ISAKMP) 
address the problem of establishing and maintaining SAs 
through the use of an automated daemon. 
The IPsec protocols themselves do not include an 
approach for managing the policies that control which 
host is allowed to establish SAs with another host and 
what kind of characteristics the SAs should have. We are 
using the OpenBSD's implementation of IPsec [13]. This 
implementation addresses the SA management problem 
by including a trust management system, KeyNote, and 
providing an additional check in the IPsec processing: it 
makes sure that the SAs to be created agree with a local 
security policy (that can be expressed in the trust 
management system's language [14]). 
 
 
Figure 3: Task Costs for a given Mode, Level and Strategy 
 
The IPsec protocols themselves do not include an 
approach for managing the policies that control which 
host is allowed to establish SAs with another host and 
what kind of characteristics the SAs should have. We are 
using the OpenBSD's implementation of IPsec [13]. This 
implementation addresses the SA management problem 
by including a trust management system, KeyNote, and 
providing an additional check in the IPsec processing: it 
makes sure that the SAs to be created agree with a local 
security policy (that can be expressed in the trust 
management system's language [14]). 
This foundation gives us the opportunity to apply our 
QoSS ideas. We activate the local security policy for 
IPsec based on the current selection for the network mode 
and the security level. If the network mode changes to 
reflect a modification in the system status, or if we just 
want to execute the same application but with higher 
security, then we update the local security policy enforced 
by the trust management system. Then we signal the 
automated keying daemon that from now on it should use 
the new policy when negotiating SAs. Additionally, 
currently active SAs are renegotiated to conform to the 
current set of security requirements. 
This way, we manage to provide different IPsec 
processing to traffic according to system settings: for 
example, when we are in "Normal" mode and "Low" 
security level, we apply no IPsec processing to finger 
traffic and we encrypt telnet traffic with DES. If we 
change security level to "High", then subsequent finger 
traffic is authenticated with SHA, and telnet traffic is 
encrypted with AES. Other things could change as a result 
of our selections: the set of hosts we are willing to 
communicate with using IPsec, the SA lifetimes, the key 
lengths or rounds for variable key-size / variable round 
algorithms.  
Currently we have predefined sets of alternate local 
security policies that describe the characteristics we want 
our SAs to have for each <network mo de, security level> 
pair and we make active the proper selection through one 
of our programs. We are working on identifying an 
architecture that would allow the trust management 
system and/or the automated daemon to be automatically 
notified of changes to QoSS parameters (like network 
mode, security level) and to adjust properly the SA 
characteristics they are willing to negotiate.  
Furthermore we plan to conduct experiments and 
measurements to help us understand the impact of QoSS 
on the performance of applications under various network 




We presented here our approach for handling security 
as a QoS dimension and we discussed how variability in 
network security services and their associated costs can be 
managed in a middleware environment. Finally we 
illustrated that a security mechanism like IPsec, can be 





[1] Foster, I. and Kesselman, C., “Globus: A Metacomputing 
Infrastructure Toolkit”, Intl J. Supercomputer applications, 
11(2):115-128, 1997 
 
[2] Dail, H., Obertelli, G., Berman F., Wolski, R., Grimshaw, 
A., “Application-Aware Scheduling of a 
Magnetohydrodynamics Application in the Legion 
Metasystem”, Proc. of the Ninth Heterogeneous Computing 
Workshop (HCW 2000), Cancun, Mexico, May 2000, pp. 
216-228 
[3] Huh, E.N., Welch, L.R., Shirazi, B.A., Cavanaugh, C.D., 
“Heterogeneous Resource Management for Dynamic Real-
Time Systems”, Proc. of the Ninth Heterogeneous 
Computing Workshop (HCW 2000), Cancun, Mexico, May 
2000, pp. 287-296 
[4] Hensgen, D., Kidd, T., St. John. D. Schnaidt, M., Siegel, 
H.J., Braun, T., Maheswaran, M., Ali, S., Kim, J., Irvine, 
C., Levin, T., Freund, R., Kussow, M., Godfrey, M., 
Duman, A., Carff, P., Kidd, S., Prasanna, V., Bhat, P., 
Alhusaini, A., “An Overview of MSHN: The Management 
System for Heterogeneous Networks”, Proc. of the Eighth 
Heterogeneous Computing Workshop (HCW’99), San 
Juan, Puerto Rico, April 1999, pp. 184-198 
[5] Linn, J., Generic Security Service Application Program 
Interface, IETF Request for Comments: 1508, September 
1993 
[6] Schneck, P.A. and Schwan, K, “Dynamic Authentication for 
High-Performance Networked Applications”, Technical 
Report GIT-CC-98-08, Georgia Institute of Technology, 
College of Computing, Atlanta, GA, 1998 
[7] Irvine, C. and Levin, T., “The Effects of Security Choices 
and Limits in a Metacomputing Environment”, Technical 
Report NPS-CS-00-004, Naval Postgraduate School, 
Monterey, CA, January 2000 
[8] Irvine, C. and Levin, T., “Toward a Taxonomy and Costing 
Method for Security Services”, Proc. of the Computer 
Security Applications Conference, Phoenix, AZ, December 
1999, pp. 183-188. 
[9] Irvine, C. and Levin, T., “A Note on Mapping User-Oriented 
Security Policies to Complex Mechanisms and Services”, 
Technical Report NPS-CS-99-08, Naval Postgraduate 
School, Monterey, CA, June 1999. 
[10] Irvine, C. and Levin, T., “Quality of Security Service”, 
Proc. of New Security Paradigms Workshop 2000, Cork, 
Ireland, September 2000, pp. 91-99 
[11] Spyropoulou, E., Levin, T., and Irvine, C., "Calculating 
Costs for Quality of Security Service", Proc. of the 
Computer Security Applications Conference, New Orleans, 
LA, December 2000, pp. 334-343. 
[12]  Kent. S. and Atkinson, R., "Security Architecture for the 
Internet Protocol", Internet RFC 2401, Internet Engineering 
Task Force, November 1998 
[13] Blaze, M., Ioannidis, J. and Keromytis, A.D., "Trust 
Management for IPSec", Proc. of the Internet Society 
Symposium on Network and Distributed Systems Security 
2001, San Diego, CA, February 2001, pp. 139-151. 
[14] Blaze, M., Feigenbaum, J., Ioannidis, J. and Keromytis, 
A.D., "The KeyNote Trust Management System Version 
2", Internet RFC 2704, Internet Engineering Task Force, 
September 1999. 
 
